

Agency Information

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FROM : SCOWCROFT, BRENT
TO :

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SUBJECTS :

KISSINGER, HENRY A.
SCOWCROFT, BRENT
ASSASSINATIONS, FOREIGN LEADERS
CIA
COLBY, WILLIAM E.
FORD, GERALD R.

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COMMENTS : Participants: Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft. Handwritten notes. For typed transcript see ID#
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X X Free vehicles of departing - Car at
SW drive (Vogel + the car)

I think a Open evolution is very encouraging

P. Some of smart people in Eus must see we
are making a producer need income

K. That's right. One way would be to raise price. But to do
that they would have to cut prod. They can't agree
on how to allocate acts. If we were free w/c Saudis,
we could get at least a deal not to cut prod. That is
why this discriminate comparison of a Jew is outrageous
Ethiopia. My reason is to send them 7 mil
+ encourage invest. If any has asked for
aid assist. &

P. What do they want. What kind of attitude is it

K. I fear it. They finally and have some neighbors
who are disturbing.

I'm uneasy about it. They have asked for equipment
for a oil fields - not even a study pump.

If necessary, I would like letter from you saying
you can't accept a statement + if we got answer
you will put forward a Modif. of Kayser plan (a?
book)

I think we just can't go to Geneva as a longer part

P. The toughest position to get them to act is what
I favor.

K. Assad has even indicated he would take a limited
agreement & would sign a peace treaty. He was willing
to drop PhO; now he exhibiting PhO to Syrian things.
We can't bring Assad in - even tho. if I tried, he would
be so obvious it would be slower than E and then
we could move it to Geneva after E settled - but
that's too tricky. I would rather tell him a truth
privately - that we would make an effort as soon
as E-I finish.

- P But is my preference
- K The big issue is with you take an I for another Syrian move.
- P I've brought up him and I go there Geneva - which will fail, then as it would come to us.
- K I think Assad will want something before Geneva - the other would be ideal.
- P Could you talk tell him we are trying to get something before Geneva
- K Yes, but you have to know that would be bloody w/c I. If we could get 5-10 km on Golan we would be in good shape. I will claim it during their defensive exp.
- It is important whether I can tell Assad we will make a major effort. We will have to move into any position T & I.
- P If you think that is the best way to get progress, I am for it.
- K We would be drawn to a Syrian move, either before or after
- P Suppose a I say let's go to Geneva, & S & does -
- K We can go to Geneva, what happens with Assad on Syria. Sabot won't want Geneva - he will want to rest, come here for big things. I will want to to avoid Syrian regret, so Syria won't want it. So only T & S will want to go to Geneva
- P Can't we commit to good faith effort?
- K A good faith effort is bound to fail. It won't even get off - ground - I can't look at it.
- P A good faith effort to me is one where one party is sincere
- K OK. If I see opening to get us to Geneva - maybe

SC would carry a case to get everyone to believe that
could be fine.
K I have given you a Schmitt light.

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